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ROBERT P . FLOOD and ANDREW K. ROSE*
This paper tests for uncovered interest parity (UIP) using daily data for 23 devel-
oping and developed countries during the crisis-strewn 1990s. We find that UIP
works better on average in the 1990s than in previous eras in the sense that the
slope coefficient from a regression of exchange rate changes on interest differen-
tials yields a positive coefficient (which is sometimes insignificantly different from
unity). UIP works systematically worse for fixed and flexible exchange rate coun-
tries than for crisis countries, but we find no significant differences between rich
and poor countries. [JEL F32, G15]
U
ncovered interest parity (UIP) is a classic topic of international finance, a
critical building block of most theoretical models, and a dismal empirical
failure. UIP states that the interest differential is, on average, equal to the ex post
exchange rate change. A strong consensus has developed in the literature that UIP
works poorly; it predicts that countries with high interest rates should, on average,
have depreciating currencies. Instead, such currencies have tended to appreciate.
Surveys are provided by Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990), and Lewis
(1995). In this short paper, we use recent data for a wide variety of countries to
reexamine the performance of UIP during the 1990s.
It is easy to make a case for taking another look at UIP. The vast majority of
literature on UIP uses data drawn from low-inflation, floating exchange rate regimes
(though our previous work also uses European fixed exchange rate observations; 
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Razin held at Tel Aviv University for comments.see Flood and Rose, 1996). UIP may work differently for countries in crisis, whose
exchange and interest rates both display considerably more volatility. This volatility
raises the stakes for financial markets and central banks; it also may provide a more
statistically powerful test for the UIP hypothesis. UIP may also work differently
over time as financial markets deepen; UIP deviations may also vary across coun-
tries for the same reason, as recently argued by Bansal and Dahlquist (2000).
Finally, and as the proximate motivation for this paper, deviations from UIP are the
basis for interest rate defenses of fixed exchange rates. Consider the actions of the
monetary authority of a country under speculative pressure that is considering
responding with an increase in interest rates—the classic interest rate defense. If
UIP holds, the domestic interest rate increase is offset exactly by a larger expected
currency depreciation. Investors see through the policy actions, so that no advan-
tage is conferred to domestic securities. Policy-exploitable deviations from UIP are,
therefore, a necessary condition for an interest rate defense.
In this short article, we test UIP using recent high-frequency data from a large
number of countries. We use data from the 1990s and include all the major
currency crises. We find that the old consensus needs updating. While UIP still
does not work well, it works better than it used to, in the sense that countries with
high interest rates at least tend to have depreciating currencies (though not equal
to the interest rate differential). There is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in
our results, which differ wildly by country. Some of this is systematic; we find that
UIP works worse for fixed-rate countries. There is less heterogeneity by fore-
casting horizon, however, and almost none by country income.
I. Methodology
We use standard methods (summarized in Flood and Rose, 1996). The hypothesis
of uncovered interest parity can be expressed as:
(1)
where it represents the return on a domestic asset at time t of maturity ∆ , i* is the
return on a comparable foreign asset, S is the domestic-currency price of a unit of
foreign exchange, and Et(.) is the expectations operator conditional upon infor-
mation available at time t.
We follow the literature by taking natural logarithms and ignoring cross terms
(most of the countries we consider have only low interest rates). Assuming rational
expectations and rearranging, we derive
(2)
where s is the natural logarithm of S, ε t is minus the forecasting error realized at
t +∆ from a forecast of the exchange rate made at time t, and α and β are regres-
sion coefficients. Equation (2) has been used as the workhorse for the UIP litera-
ture. The null hypothesis of UIP can be expressed as H0: α =0 ,β = 1, though in
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253practice almost all the focus in the literature has been on β . Since ε t is a fore-
casting error, it is assumed to be stationary and orthogonal to information avail-
able at time t (including interest rates). Ordinary least squares is, therefore, a
consistent estimator of β ; it is the standard choice in the literature, and we follow
this practice. Researchers have typically estimated β to be significantly negative.
Usually α is found to be nontrivial.1
In practice, we modify testing (2) in two slight ways. First, we pool data from
a number of countries, an admissible way of increasing the sample under the null
hypothesis.2 Second, we use daily data for exchange rate forecasts of up to one
quarter of a year. The fact that ∆ is greater than unity induces ε to have a moving-
average, “overlapping observation” structure. We account for this by estimating
our covariance matrices with the Newey and West (1987) estimator, with an appro-
priate (∆ ) number of off-diagonal bands.
II. The Data Set
We are interested in studying how UIP performs of late in a variety of countries,
especially those suffering from currency crises during the 1990s. These crises
were usually surprising events requiring quick policy responses.3 In this spirit, we
study the crises using a high-frequency, cross-country data set. High-frequency
data is of special importance to us given our focus on the interest rate defense of
fixed exchange rates.
We gathered daily data for the interest and exchange rates of 23 countries
during the 1990s. Our sample includes 13 developed countries (Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States). We choose these countries to allow
us to examine a variety of exchange rate regimes ranging from floating (Australia
and Canada) to countries such as Germany and France that are European
Monetary System (EMS) participants and have joined the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). A number of these developed countries also experienced
currency crises in the 1990s, including Finland, Italy, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. We include also data for 10 important and interesting developing coun-
tries (Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand). The crises experienced by these coun-
tries account for most of the important action in the 1990s; we include all “the
usual suspects.” Indeed, it is difficult to think of an important emerging market that
did not experience a crisis at some point during the 1990s. Nevertheless, there
were considerable periods of tranquility through this period. These, together with
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1Many have tried to interpret deviations from UIP as risk premiums; here we simply measure UIP
deviations carefully and encourage others to link these deviations to other phenomena.
2It is likely that many of the countries are receiving correlated shocks, so that a SUR technique (which
takes into account this cross-sectional dependence) would result in more efficient estimates; we did this in our
1996 paper. Nevertheless, we do not pursue this angle here, since to use SUR, one has to throw out observa-
tions when one or more countries are missing data; this results in a loss of efficiency. Further, the real problem
with UIP, at least in our sample, is in the first moment of the data, not the precision of the slope estimates.
3See, for example, Rose and Svensson (1994) and Boorman and others (2000).the many successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks, lead us to believe that
our estimates will not suffer from the “peso problem.”
Our data are drawn from two sources. (See Table A3 in the appendix for a
listing of our data sources by country.) Whenever possible, we use the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) data set. Our default measure of exchange rates is
a representative dollar spot rate quoted at 2:15 p.m. Brussels time (BIS mnemonic
QBCA). Our default measure of interest rates is a one-month bid rate from the
euro money market quoted at about 10:00 a.m. Swiss time (BIS mnemonic
JDBA). However, a number of our countries do not have one or both of these series
available. Accordingly, we supplement our BIS data with series drawn from
Bloomberg. To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the monthly
forecast horizon, we also include interest rate data for three different maturities:
one day, one week, and one quarter. Further details and the data set itself are avail-
able online at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/. The data set has been
checked and corrected for errors.
We use the United States as the “center country” for all exchange rates
(including that of Germany), except for nine European countries (the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom), for which we treat Germany as the anchor. We choose our
center countries in this way to shed the maximum amount of light on the efficacy
of the interest rate defense.
Figure A1 in the appendix contains time-series plots of the exchange rates.
The price of a U.S. dollar is portrayed for all countries we studied except for the
nine European countries, which portray the price of a deutsche mark. (Scales vary
across different plots, as they do in all of the figures.) The breaks in series are
usually associated with currency crises or other regime breaks. For instance, the
Brazilian exchange rate shows clearly both the adoption of the real after the hyper-
inflation of the early 1990s and the flotation of the real in January 1999. Similar
breaks are apparent for many other countries, including Indonesia, Italy, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand. The convergence of the EMS rates and
the creation of the euro in 1999 are also apparent in the (non-German) EMU rates.
Figure A2 is an analogue showing interest rates. Monthly interest rates are
shown for all countries except for Russia (where weekly rates are shown, since the
monthly series is short), Finland, and Korea (where quarterly rates are shown for
the same reason).4 Here the currency crises appear as spikes in interest rates. These
spikes are particularly obvious during the EMS crisis of 1992–93 (for example, for
Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, and Sweden), the Mexico crisis of 1994–95 (for
Argentina and Mexico), the Asian crisis of 1997 (for Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), and the Russian crisis of 1998. Again, since
scales differ, the plots should be interpreted carefully (for example, because of the
hyperinflation that preceded the start of the Brazilian real plan).
Figure A3 combines the exchange and interest rate data into a single 
series, which we call “excess returns.” Excess returns (er) are defined as
[ert+∆ ≡ (st+∆ – st)–( it – it *)], annualized appropriately. Under the UIP null
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4We define a month as 22 business days, a week as 5 business days, and a quarter as 65 business days.hypothesis (H0: α =0 ,β =1 )   Etert+∆ = 0. Again, we use a monthly horizon as our
default (so that we use one-month interest rates and set ∆ equal to one month); the
only exceptions are Russia (for which we use weekly rates and horizon), and Finland
and Korea (for which quarterly rates and horizon are used). 
In essence, the plots in Figure A3 show the results of taking a short position
in the currency. For example, since Argentina did not deviate from its peg with the
U.S. dollar, the payoff from attacking the Argentine peso was consistently nega-
tive throughout the 1990s, and dramatically so during the interest rate defense
against the “tequila” attacks of early 1995. The successful attacks against the
Korean won, the Mexican peso, and the Russian ruble show up as large positive
payoffs when the currencies were floated.
Where Figure A3 provides a look at a combination of exchange rate changes
and interest rate differentials over time, Figure A4 graphs the exchange rate
changes and interest rate differentials against each other. Instead of examining the
time-series patterns on a country-by-country basis as in Figure A3, we pool the
country data. Exchange rate changes (on the ordinate) are more volatile than
interest rate differentials (on the abscissa) for each horizon. There clearly is no
tight relationship between exchange rate changes and interest differentials. This is
no surprise; interest differentials are not very useful in predicting exchange rate
changes. Since the visual impression is unclear, we now proceed to more rigorous
statistical analysis, which is essentially an analogue to the graphs in Figure A4.
III. UIP Regression Analysis
Table A1 in the appendix provides estimates of β when equation (2) is estimated on
a country-by-country basis; that is, the regressions are estimated for an individual
country over time. Newey-West standard errors that are robust to both heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation (induced by the overlapping observation problem) are
recorded in parentheses below. We focus on the monthly horizon results but also
tabulate the results for the three other forecasting horizons as a sensitivity check.
The most striking thing about the estimates of β is their heterogeneity. Of the
21 estimates, 12 are negative and 7 are positive (2 are essentially zero). This, in
itself, is interesting, since virtually all estimates in the literature are negative.
Further, all but one of the negative estimates are insignificantly so, while three of
the positive coefficients are significant. At conventional significance levels, only
nine of the slopes are insignificantly different from the hypothesized value of
unity. This is frequently because of large standard errors, however, rather than
point estimates close to unity, so even this evidence is weak.5 Finally, the point
estimates vary across forecast horizons, often switching signs.
We do not report estimates of the intercept (α ) in Table A1. They are of less
interest, and are usually insignificantly different from zero, at conventional confi-
dence levels. For instance, of the 21 intercepts estimated at the monthly horizon, only
Robert P . Flood and Andrew K.Rose
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5Some of the standard errors are very low, however; they may be biased because of non-normalities
associated with jumps at currency crises. Hence we recommend that readers not take our covariance esti-
mates too literally.2 are significant at conventional significance levels: Canada (with a positive intercept
and a t-statistic of 2.1) and Japan (with a negative intercept and a t-statistic of 2.0).
Table A2 pools the data across countries, so that a single β is estimated for all
countries and periods of time. Here, too, the results are striking. In particular, the
top panel shows that the pooled estimate is positive at all four horizons. At the
monthly horizon, β is significantly positive, though at 0.19 it is far below its theo-
retical value of unity. At the other horizons, β is even higher and insignificantly
different from unity (and strikingly close to unity, though with large standard
errors, when daily and weekly horizons are used).6 Still, pooling is a dubious
procedure given the heterogeneity manifest in Table A1, so we do not take these
results too seriously.7
The other panels of Table A2 add interactions between dummy variables and the
interest differential. Panel B includes an interaction with the exchange rate regime.
We consider Argentina, Denmark, France, and Hong Kong SAR to have fixed their
exchange rates throughout the sample, while we classify Australia, Canada,
Germany, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland as floaters. The other (“crisis”) countries
experienced at least one regime switch and are omitted from our control group.
We find that both fixers and floaters have significantly lower estimates of β ,
in contrast to the findings of our earlier study (Flood and Rose, 1996), which used
data from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. Thus the marginally better UIP
results that stem from pooling across countries must be largely due to the inclu-
sion of countries whose exchange rate parities were successfully attacked. 
When we examine interactions between the interest rate differential and a
dummy variable that is unity for countries that were members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development at the beginning of the decade, we
find insignificantly different results. This result stands in contrast to the estimates
provided by Bansal and Dahlquist (2000).8
Finally, we dummy out the three countries that experienced high inflation at
some point during the sample period (Argentina, Brazil, and Russia). When we do
so, we find in Panel D that some of our positive results stem from high-inflation
countries; the interaction terms are typically positive and economically large (espe-
cially at shorter horizons). However, our point estimates for β are still positive or
zero, unlike those in most of the literature (though our standard errors are large).
IV. Conclusion
Uncovered interest parity works better than it used to, in the sense that interest rate
differentials seem often to be followed by exchange rate depreciation. The fact that
this relationship was positive on average during the 1990s contrasts sharply with
the typically negative estimates of the past. When the daily and weekly horizons
are used, this relationship even seems to be proportionate if one includes high-
UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY IN CRISIS
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6Chinn and Meredith (2000) find even more positive results using long-maturity data.
7This is especially true since the Hildreth-Houck random-coefficients method delivers slope coeffi-
cients that are economically and statistically insignificant on our pooled data.
8Our data set is deeper and narrower, focusing on more horizons and daily data instead of the monthly
horizon stretching back to 1976 that is employed in Bansal and Dahlquist (2000).inflation countries. Nevertheless, there are still massive departures from uncov-
ered interest parity. There is enormous heterogeneity in the UIP relationship across
countries, though we have been unable to find a close relationship between depar-
tures from UIP and either the exchange rate regime or country income.
Robert P . Flood and Andrew K.Rose
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Table A1. Uncovered Interest Parity Tests, by Country
(OLS estimates of β from (st+∆ –st) = α + β (i – i*)t + ε t)
Horizon Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly
















Germany –0.60 0.13 –0.11
(1.32) (1.11) (1.16)
Hong Kong SAR –0.35 –0.20 0.00 –0.00
(0.18) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Indonesia 0.22 –1.19
(2.05) (1.13)
Italy 1.66 0.29 –0.75
(1.87) (2.55) (1.92)
Japan –0.82 –3.14 –1.71 –1.84
(1.36) (1.83) (1.11) (1.19)








Russia 1.48 1.29 0.22
(1.46) (0.58) (0.11)




Thailand 0.52 –1.29 –0.83
(1.86) (1.57) (1.80)
United Kingdom –1.15 –1.26 –1.42
(1.06) (0.97) (0.98)
Note: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.Robert P . Flood and Andrew K.Rose
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Table A2. Pooled Uncovered Interest Parity Tests
(OLS estimates of β from (sit+∆ –sit) = α + β (i – i*)it + ε it)
Panel A. No Interactions










Panel B. Exchange Rate Regime Interactions
β FIX*β FLOAT*β Number of  P-value:
(se) (se) (se) Observations Interactions=0
Daily 0.87 –0.94 –0.71 26,972 0.21
(0.67) (0.58) (10.23)
Weekly 0.92 –0.87 –1.26 8,033 0.00
(0.37) (0.29) (1.40)
Monthly 0.19 –0.93 –0.20 37,992 0.01
(0.01) (0.32) (0.48)
Quarterly 0.43 –0.54 –0.47 18,942 0.44
(0.49) (0.42) (0.94)






















Note: Newey-West standard errors appear in parentheses.UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY IN CRISIS
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Table A3. Sources of Exchange Rate and Monthly-Horizon Interest Data






















United Kingdom BIS BIS
United States  BIS
Note: BIS denotes Bank for International Settlements.REFERENCES
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